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INTRODUCTION

How does the current legal framework safeguard the individual rights of teachers to religious and
ideological freedom, whilst at the same time protecting the collective rights of school communities
to provide an educational context aligned to identified values and principles? How does the law seek
to find a resolution or accommodation where there is a clear conflict?

The relationship between religion, education, law, society, and citizenship has been a political hotpotato in England ever since the State first began to involve itself in schooling in a concerted and
coordinated way. The Forster Education Act of 1870 marked the beginning of national educational
provision, at least at an elementary level,1 and it was no accident that this landmark statute
famously contained the Cowper-Temple Clause.2 This required all religious education to be nondenominational, reflecting the bitter wrangling between Anglican and Non-Conformist
educationalists in the Victorian era.

In the contemporary context, domestic and international legal instruments 3 safeguard the
ideological liberty of families and children. 4 For example, Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European
Convention on Human Rights explicitly requires States to respect the religious and philosophical
convictions of parents in the provision of education.

1

G Parsons, Religion in Victorian Britain (Manchester University Press 1988) 60-61.
Education Act 1870, s 14.
3 N Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 63-64.
4 There is a welcome and growing recognition amongst jurists and policy-makers alike, that children enjoy
independent human rights in religion as in other spheres. See, for example, S Langlaude, The Right of the Child
to Religious Freedom in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) and United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Article 14.
2

The freedoms of parents and children are critical in this context, and there is rightly an
overwhelming consensus that they should be protected. However, they are not the only
stakeholders in the educational framework: national government, local authorities, grass-roots
communities, faith and belief groups, as well as society as a whole all have an interest in the
schooling of the next generation, and the way in which religion is dealt with in the education system
is the subject of constant debate, as competing ideas and priorities collide. Nevertheless, what about
the people who are directly responsible for delivering this much contested education? Ironically,
those in the very eye of the storm are sometimes apt to be overlooked, although teachers also
undeniably have human rights, including the right to hold and manifest beliefs, and these may come
into conflict with other rights and interests at play, as has been evidenced by recent cases in the UK
media5 and courts.6

This article examines the reported case law on teaching staff in dispute with their schools on
religious grounds, as well as considering whether their interests are adequately protected and
whether an appropriate balance is struck between multiple competing needs in such cases. As a
necessary preliminary to this investigation, we begin by setting out the ways in which different types
of schools in England deal with religion in their institutional life. This is crucial, because the rights,
expectations, understandings and agreements in place vary where faith and conscience are
concerned, both for teachers and third parties, who have competing or parallel interests. Once we
have laid these foundations, we will move on to our assessment of the position of teachers in
situations of conflict and shall suggest way forwards in these controversial matters.

THE TREATMENT OF RELIGION WITHIN THE ENGLISH SCHOOLS FRAMEWORK
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Maya Oppenheim, ‘Teacher suspended for referring to a transgender pupil as a girl rather than a boy’ The
Independent (14 November 17).
6 De Groen v Gan Menachem Hendon (2017) ET Case Number: 3347281/2016 (De Groen).

Forms of State Maintained School: Overall approaches to religion

The educational system in England has been accurately described as ‘an area of intricate interaction
between State and religion’. 7 As Sandberg correctly points out, it is inappropriate to differentiate
between faith schools and state schools.8 The question of whether a school is state maintained,9 and
the question of whether it has a defined religious character, are in fact two entirely separate issues.
The School Standards and Framework Act 1998 established the concept of schools with a ‘religious
character’,10 but it is important to appreciate that maintained and independent schools11 alike can
come within or without this category. Any school may be designated as having a religious character,
and attract the legal consequences which accompany this status, regardless of what its funding
source may be.

The desirability of faith schools funded in whole or in part from the public purse is a political
question, and not one which we intend to explore within this discourse. Their existence has been
consistently supported by Administrations led by both left and right-wing parties, and there are no
indications of a dramatic shift in policy in this regard on the horizon. The State has chosen to
subsidise collective religious freedom, by assisting faith communities in providing an educational
environment in harmony with their belief system, rather than making this liberty a privilege of the
rich. Clearly, in supporting faith schools, public authorities must grant such institutions some
latitude and autonomy in developing an environment and ethos which is reflective of the values of
the faith group, rather than the State, as otherwise the provision of funding is somewhat self7

R Catto, G Davie and D Perfect, ‘State and Religion in Great Britain: Constitutional Foundations, Religious
Minorities, the Law and Education’ (2015) 17:1 Insight Turkey 79. The comments also encompass Wales.
8 R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2012) 152.
9 We shall discuss the position of independent schools in the last subsection within this section.
10 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, ss 58-69 (as amended).
11 We have used the terms ‘independent’ and ‘private’ schools to refer to institutions not in receipt of funding
from the State. We have avoided the English term ‘public schools’ in relation to fee paying institutions, as it
may be confusing to an international readership.

defeating. Whilst the executive is entitled to take an interest in where and how its monies are being
applied, and for example, it has indicated that it will not fund schools presenting Creationism or
Intelligent Design as scientific or factual terms,12 generally speaking, it will not seek to involve itself
in the ideological character or self-understanding of the school.13 Whether or not assisting faithcommunities in providing such schooling is beneficial in terms of social policy, is a separate matter
and beyond the scope of our legal investigation.

It should also be appreciated that no schools within the state supported sector are wholly divorced
from religion, as is demonstrated by Rivers’ insightful suggestion that almost all state maintained
schools in England are in some sense “faith schools” by virtue of the out-workings of an established
religion.14 For instance, maintained schools with no religious ethos are required by statute to hold a
daily act of worship, 15 which is ‘wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian character’, 16 clearly
demonstrating that such schools do not purport to have a truly secular nature. However, it should
be stressed that the question of whether a given school is a faith school (in the commonly used
sense of having a defined religious ethos) is a separate issue from the question of the legal model
under which it is constituted and operates.

There are various forms of maintained schools in England: academies and free schools, voluntary
aided and voluntary controlled schools, foundation schools, and community and community special
schools. The categories are differentiated in terms of the kinds of legal entities that control each
type of maintained schools, the groups and interests that contribute to schools’ decision-making and
12

‘Richard Dawkins celebrates victory over creationists: free schools that teach intelligent design will lose
funding’ The Guardian (14/1/2012) https://www.theguardian.com/education/2012/jan/15/free-schoolscreationism-intelligent-design
13 Subject of course to the school satisfying the rigours of the relevant educational inspectorate, statutory
provisions in relation to British Values and the Prevent Duty (Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015) and the
generally applicable law on child welfare and protection (Children Act 1989)
14 J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (Oxford University Press 2010) 234. This comment encompasses
Wales as well.
15 Education Act 1996, s 390.
16 ibid at sch 20.

funding, as well as the degree of autonomy which schools within each category enjoy. Clearly, this
may be highly relevant to teachers as employees, in terms of the expectations placed upon them in
the workplace, the ethos in which they are required to operate professionally and the people who
make managerial and policy decisions which have an impact upon them.

Academies are funded directly by the Government, are independent of the local authority, are run
by charitable trusts, and may be supported by corporate or other sponsors, including religious
denominations. The religious nature of some academies has created a more robustly independent
form of state funded faith school. Academies need not follow the national curriculum, but are bound
by the same regulatory framework on admissions, special educational needs and exclusions which
apply to other maintained schools. 17 Free schools function in much the same way as academies, but
tend to be newly founded schools, rather than institutions which have converted from another
model.18

Voluntary aided, voluntary controlled and foundation schools all have less autonomy than
academies and free schools, although considerably more than community schools, 19 and all follow
the national curriculum. Voluntary aided schools are supported by a charitable foundation,
frequently a religious organisation, which contributes to operational and building costs, whilst
having significant input into governance. Governors appointed by the foundation will outnumber
other governors by a majority of two.20 Voluntary controlled schools have a similar structure, but

17

HM Government, ‘Types of Schools, Academies’ <www.gov.uk/types-of-school/academies> accessed 25
February 2018.
18 Academies Act 2010.
19 HM Government, ‘Types of Schools’ (n 16). Community schools still are controlled directly by the Local
Authority.
20 The Church of England, Diocese of Derby, ‘Aided and Controlled Schools: What’s the Difference?’
(September
2005)
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<http://derby.anglican.org/education/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/whats-thedifference-leaflet.pdf> accessed 25 February 2018 .

enjoy less freedom and do not receive any building costs from the foundation. In addition,
foundation governors will be in the minority on the governing body. 21

Faith schools tend to be voluntary controlled or voluntary aided schools, but some foundation
schools do have a religious character. 22 Foundation schools are funded wholly by the local authority,
but the governing body employs the staff and has responsibility for admissions to the school. It is
worth noting that practices and policies vary greatly between individual schools, and that there is no
evidence that the manner in which a religious ethos is made manifest strongly correlates to the
governance model of the school in question. This is material to the position of teachers making
career choices, as a potential job applicant could not make reasonable deductions about the
outworking of a religious ethos based on the type of school offering employment.

Community and community special schools are the only types of maintained schools which cannot
have a religious character, but significantly, the Government itself describes them not as secular, but
as ‘not influenced by … religious groups’. 23 Such schools are nonetheless subject to the requirements
of applicable legislation regarding religion.

Thus, as is evident from this brief overview of a somewhat byzantine system, religious bodies have
considerable input into the governance of a number of categories of maintained schools. We now
turn to the question of admissions of pupils.

21

ibid.
L Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in Schools: The Employment of Teachers and the Public Sector Duty’ in M
Hunter-Henin (ed), Law, Religion and Freedoms in Europe: Education in Europe (Ashgate 2011) 87.
23 HM Government (n 16).
22

Maintained Schools and Admissions

As might be expected, maintained schools in England without a religious ethos may not discriminate
on faith grounds when it comes to admissions. 24 Maintained schools with a religious ethos are
granted some exceptions from general discrimination law concerning the selection of pupils, 25 but
the school must be over-subscribed before faith related criteria can be legitimately applied.26 This
safeguard is controversial in its practical application, given the difficulty of defining whether an
individual is a member of a faith community. As Barber observes, the courts are in general reluctant
to interfere with the determination of religious authorities on this point, but there remains scope for
wrangling and in the worst case scenarios either litigation or deliberate exclusion of some groups. 27
The system strives for a balance between, on the one hand, interests of schools with a religious
character in fostering it, and on the other, access for the wider community to the local maintained
school.

Although the impact of these policies upon teachers will be an indirect one, it is apparent that there
are a number of ways in which it will have a material influence on their working environment, and
the attitudes and expectations of the student body will inevitably be shaped by the worldview within
which they live. Furthermore, the concerns of the parent body may also be moulded by the
teachings and practices of the religion to which they subscribe, and this clearly may have an impact
upon decisions within the school community which influence subjects and policies not related to
religion directly.

24

Equality Act 2010, s 4.
ibid sch 11. Beyond the admissions policy itself, other manifestations of the school’s religious ethos, such as
dress codes [Schools Admission Code for 2007, paras 2.41–3] may also affect the make-up of the school by
(consciously or unconsciously) discouraging some families from applying. [P Barber, ‘State schools and religious
authority-where to draw the line?’ (2010) ELJ 224.] A requirement that women not wear mini-skirts, leggings
or trousers on the school site, may make families from outside the faith community less likely to seek
admission. Are the additional citations in this FN necessary, in light of the two subsequent notes?
26 Schools Admission Code for 2007, paras 2.41–3.
27 P Barber, ‘State schools and religious authority-where to draw the line?’ (2010) ELJ 224.
25

The effect may be more disconcerting for teachers whose religious identity differs from that of the
school, when there is disagreement within the relevant faith community over a particular issue. The
greater the numerical dominance of a given faith group, the higher the chances are that a critical
mass of vociferous subgroups persuading the institution to support their agenda on a specific issue.
For example, as C S Lewis and J R R Tolkien demonstrate, by no means all Christians object to
children reading books about magic and witchcraft, but some conservative Christians do believe that
such material is dangerous and should be banned from UK classrooms. 28 Equally, some, but by no
means all, Muslim parents do not wish their children to learn musical instruments.29

Given the scope for disagreement within faith groups, and how nuanced some of the issues can be,
it is not difficult to see how teachers not immersed in the relevant religion could be inadvertently
causing controversy or offence. Admissions criteria relate to the strength and dominance of the
religious character of the school, which in turn may affect how easy staff members find it to
integrate themselves within the school community and respond sensitively to their environment.
There is always the potential for parental complaints to lead to disciplinary matters, and such
expressions of dissatisfaction must almost inevitably increase work-stress for those on the receiving
end of negative feedback.

Needless to say, we are not suggesting that either those responsible for the governance of faith
schools, or families who consciously choose to send their children there, will necessarily be hostile to
different perspectives or inevitably generate a culture which is problematic for teachers who do not
share the religious outlook of the school. Nevertheless, in creating an environment with limited

28

J Espinoza, ‘Religious parents want Harry Potter banned from classrooms because it glorifies witchcraft’ The
Telegraph (16 December 2015) <www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/12052212/Religiousparents-want-Harry-Potter-banned-from-the-classroom-because-it-glorifies-witchcraft.html> accessed 25
February 2018.
29 G Paton, ‘Muslim pupils withdrawn from music lessons’ The Telegraph (1 July 10)
<www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/7866176/Muslim-pupils-withdrawn-from-musiclessons.html> accessed 25 February 2018.

diversity, admissions policies increase the potential for unconscious bias and conflict born of mutual
misunderstanding.30 Undoubtedly, it is possible for faith schools to take steps to counterbalance
such intrinsic bias, and create a welcoming environment for all, but doing so requires some proactive initiative.

In any event, it is equally legitimate to ask how schools could reasonably be expected to maintain a
religious ethos without some capacity to select pupils on religious grounds, and it must be
acknowledged that the decision as to whether to support and facilitate faith schools is ultimately a
political, rather than a legal one. As noted above, we are certainly not suggesting that in legal terms,
having a faith-related admissions policy inevitably leads to less favourable treatment for employees
who do not conform to the prevailing religious culture, but we are simply noting that there is a
heightened risk of this occurring if the situation is not proactively managed. Once we have focused
on admissions of pupils, it is timely to turn to the employment position of teachers.

Employment in Maintained Schools

It should be noted at the outset that religion or belief is a protected characteristic under equality
legislation and that direct discrimination on this basis will be unlawful unless a school can
demonstrate its action comes within a specific statutory exemption. 31 Voluntary controlled and
foundation schools may take faith into account during the appointment process for a headteacher,32 and such schools can also designate up to one fifth of appointments of ‘reserved teachers’,
as well as selecting them on the basis of their ‘fitness and competence’ to deliver religious education

30

H Ross, Everyday Bias (Rowman & Littlefield 2014).
Equality Act 2010, s 4.
32 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s 60 .
31

in accordance with the doctrines of the faith of the school. 33 Furthermore, failure to abide by these
doctrines could potentially provide legitimate ground for disciplinary action, and even dismissal of
head-teachers and reserved teachers, if their actions were such as to undermine their ‘fitness and
competence’ to perform the role they have been appointed for.

Voluntary aided schools have even greater discretion: faith related considerations may be taken into
consideration when appointing all teaching staff and as a legitimate ground for disciplinary action
and dismissal. 34 This latitude has serious implications for the personal freedoms of individual
employees, particularly since warnings and sanctions could relate to personal life-choices outside of
the school sphere (for example, engaging in extra-marital, homosexual or inter-faith relationships).
Vickers perceptively observes that, in contrast with the provisions of the Equality Act 2010, the
School Standards and Framework Act 1998 does not apply any test of proportionality, nor require a
demonstration that the religious criteria are ‘genuine occupational requirements’ (that the religious
criterion is of practical relevance to fulfilling a legitimate aim of the school).35 This commentator
questions whether this framework is compatible with human rights law in a European context, given
that it enables discrimination against individuals on religious grounds. Other scholars36 express
similar concerns about the apparent dissonance between the current framework and equality law.

Furthermore, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has echoed concerns about a carte
blanche to discriminate, without any need to demonstrate necessity or proportionality,37 and this in
turn has been highlighted by Accord, a campaign group advocating their understanding of inclusion
within education.38 It must, therefore, be acknowledged that there are voices of disquiet in

33

ibid, s 58.
ibid,s 60.
35 Vickers (n 21)87-106.
36 R Thompson, ‘Religion, Belief, Education and Discrimination’ (2015) 14 Equal Rights Rev 71.
37 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Religion or Belief: Is the law working? (2016)23-29
<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/religion-or-belief-report-december-2016.pdf>
38 ‘Accord welcomes ECHR call to curtail teacher discrimination laws’ <
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academia, regulatory authorities and the educational sector, in relation to unrestricted freedom
conferred by the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 .

In contrast, academies and free schools designated as religious are able to apply religious criteria to
teacher-recruitment and discipline,39 but because they are not within the special provisions of the
School Standards and Framework Act, the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 apply unless the school
can demonstrate that the religious criteria form a ‘genuine occupational requirement’. 40 The
difficulties set out above in respect of other types of schools could be addressed if they were
brought into line with this position, and obliged to demonstrate that they are not infringing the
individual freedoms of teachers, except in so far as is objectively required to carry out the role for
which they are employed.

Religion and Independent Schools

It is now appropriate to turn, however briefly, to an analysis of the interaction between religion and
independent schools. Given that as we shall discuss, some of these institutions are faith schools and
benefit from some exemptions from general equality law provisions, it would leave a significant gap
if they were excluded from our discussion.

These fee-paying schools in England do not receive

direct financial support from the State, even though many such schools are eligible for significant
fiscal concessions as charities,41 and as might be anticipated, they are less restrained by regulatory
frameworks.

39

Thompson (n 35) at 76.
N Shribman, ‘A Victory for Common Sense’ (2011) 161 New Law Journal 1248-50.
41 Charities Act 2011, s 3(1)(b).
40

Independent schools control their daily schedule and their curriculum, despite the fact that the
latter must be broad and balanced, as well as satisfying the requirements of either Ofsted or an
alternative inspectorate approved by the Secretary of State.42 Irrespective of being designated as
having a religious character, independent schools can choose whether to teach religious education,
denominational or otherwise, and whether to hold collective worship on a regular basis. If
designated as having a religious character,43 they may discriminate on religious grounds in relation
to the admission of pupils, 44 regardless of being over-subscribed,45 and they may also apply what
would otherwise be unlawful discrimination in respect of teaching staff, on essentially the same
basis as voluntary aided schools discussed above.

In other words, if operating as faith schools, establishments in the private sector may require staff
members to conform to criteria which are necessary to further their institutional ethos, provided
that the requirements being imposed are not disproportionate. Of course, all schools, independent
or state maintained, with or without a religious ethos, will have a collective character and
organizational objectives. This dynamic, by its very nature, sets up the possibility for conflict
between the freedoms of individual teachers, and the values of the school as an institution, and it is
to these situations of tension, and the case law discussing it, which we now turn.

CASE LAW ON TEACHING STAFF IN CONFLICT WITH SCHOOLS ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS

So, we move to the focal part of our discussion, which is assessing, what balance the courts have
struck between the individual rights of teachers and the collective rights of their employing
42

Independent Schools Inspectorate <www.isi.net/> and <www.gov.uk/education/inspection-of-independentschools> accessed 25 February 2018.
43 In accordance with a procedure set out in secondary legislation: Religious Character of Schools (Designation
Procedure) (Independent Schools) (England) Regulations 2003.
44 ibid, sch 11, para 5(b).
45 ibid, sch 3.

institution, and whether this has been appropriate. Clearly, a potential collision between
institutional objectives and personal freedoms might arise in a wide variety of scenarios and guises.
For the ease of analysis, we propose to consider the position in relation to three broad categories of
situations: 1) Conflicts involving non-religious teachers employed in faith-schools; 2) Conflicts
involving religious teachers whose views or conduct do not accord with the ethos of the faith school
in which they work; and 3) Conflicts involving religious teachers in non-faith schools.

Conflicts involving non-religious teachers and faith-schools

To what extent may faith schools require teaching staff to comply with the doctrines of the relevant
religious community? On the one hand, the courts have adopted a fairly robust stance in relation to
employers establishing a ‘genuine occupational requirement’, and constraints cannot be imposed
without an identifiable and adequate reason. Nevertheless, individuals are potentially still left quite
exposed when it comes to situations where either a genuine occupation requirement is clear and
easy for the school to establish, or where religious criteria can be imposed without any genuine
occupational requirement being demonstrated.46 Two contrasting decisions illustrate the overall
position well.

In the Scottish case of Glasgow City Council v McNab,47 the court was not prepared to find being
Roman Catholic a genuine occupational requirement for teaching Personal and Social Education. An
atheist was employed by a Roman Catholic maintained school and was not appointed to, nor given
an interview for, a senior post which involved teaching ‘personal and social education’, whereas a
Roman Catholic teacher would have at least been interviewed. Teaching PSE did not amount to

46
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School Standards and Framework Act1998 , s 58.
Glasgow City Council v McNab , [2007] IRLR 476.

pastoral care, so the local authority could not rely on special arrangements which related to this
provision. Moreover, the mere fact that the appointment in question had to be approved by the
Roman Catholic Church did not render being Roman Catholic a ‘genuine occupational requirement’,
and it was open to the Church to approve an atheist person or person of another faith if it so chose.
Consequently, the finding that the applicant had been the victim of unlawful discrimination was
upheld.

However, an interesting counterpoint to this decision is provided by the earlier Board of Governors
of St Matthias Church of England School v Crizzle. 48 In this case, an Asian applicant argued that a
requirement for a ‘committed Communicant Christian’ applicant was discriminatory with regard to a
head-teacher post. The court found that the wording was indirectly, but not directly, discriminatory,
and therefore open to justification on the basis of a genuine occupational requirement. The
criterion was imposed for the express purpose of maintaining the ethos of the school, and was found
to be reasonable and proportionate in all of the circumstances. Thus, although courts will scrutinise
the claims of faith schools carefully in relation to genuine occupational requirements, they will
respect them where they are found to apply.

Extrapolating from this, it seems clear that teachers who are not ‘reserve’ teachers, or otherwise
lawfully recruited on faith-based criteria (e.g. in voluntary aided schools), cannot be expected to live
as if they were members of a particular faith community, nor subjected to professional disadvantage
for failure to conform to its practices, unless this had a demonstrable impact upon their ability to
carry out their role. Reasoning from first principles this must surely be correct. Given that the
statutory regime49 deliberately limits schools’ ability to discriminate on religious grounds, this
objective would be fatally undermined if schools were able to circumvent the protection by imposing
additional requirements which only members of a particular faith community would be willing or
able to meet.
48
49

Board of Governors of St Matthias Church of England School v Crizzle [1993] IRLR 472, ICR 401.
See eg Equality Act 2010 and the School Standards and Framework Act 1998.

Furthermore, courts considering these issues would also be mindful of the human rights dimension
of such a situation. Article 950 requires States to provide individual employees with appropriate legal
recourse if an employer has interfered with their right to manifest their religion or belief. 51 This does
not, of course, guarantee a remedy or vindication of the right, but the legal framework should at
least furnish individuals with a mechanism whereby the relevant interest can be weighed in the
balance, in order to establish that any limitation comes within the bounds of Article 9(2). Limiting
the freedom of an employee to manifest their atheist, agnostic or humanist worldview would be an
infringement needing justification. 52

The same consideration would apply to the expression of a political or ethical belief which violated
the school’s ethos. Consequently, for example, since the Church of England has indicated that
supporting certain far-right groups is incompatible with the Anglican faith,53 a teacher who openly
promoted the British National Party might be disciplined for failing to live in accordance with Church
teachings. In an instructive case from outside the educational context, Redfearn v United Kingdom,54
a bus driver was dismissed because of his active involvement in the British National Party. He was
unable to claim for unfair dismissal, as he had not completed the statutory minimum qualifying
period for bringing such an action, so attempted to claim that he had been the victim of indirect
racial discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal was very unsympathetic to this argument,
and dismissed it on the basis that no appropriate comparator had been proposed to demonstrate
less favourable treatment on racial grounds,55 but the Strasburg Court regarded disciplining an
employee solely for membership of an organisation as a violation of the Article 11 right to freedom
of association.

50

European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9.
Eweida v United Kingdom App no 48420/10 (ECtHR, 15 January 2013) (Eweida).
52 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, para31.
53 The Church of England, ‘BNP and National Front Incompatible with Teaching of the Church’
<www.churchofengland.org/media-centre/news/2014/06/bnp-and-national-front-incompatible-withteaching-of-church.aspx> accessed 25 February 2018.
54 Redfearn v United Kingdom [2013] IRLR 51, [2012] All ER (D) 112 (Nov).
55Redfearn v Serco Ltd [2006] IRLR 623, ICR 1367.
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Essentially, the touchstone issue will be the significance of the belief and its accompanying
expression in relation the teacher’s ability to perform their role and further their employing school’s
objectives. It is challenging to think of many hypothetical situations in which simply holding a belief
would be sufficient basis to support any sanction, but making certain beliefs known might in some
circumstances provide an employer with sufficient reason to take action, in order to maintain the
collective goals and character of the institution.

As we shall see in our discussion below in relation to religious individuals who find themselves out of
step with the doctrinal position of their employing faith school, both national courts and the Court of
Strasbourg recognise the importance of protecting collective, as well as individual religious and
ideological freedom. Consider, for instance, the reasoning of the Strasburg Court with regard to
Ladele, a registrar declining to conduct civil partnership ceremonies for same sex couples: if shielding
adult colleagues from discriminatory expressions can justify limiting freedom of conscience or
religion, then a fortiori, protecting young people in a school environment must surely be sufficient
justification.56

A much more complicated question would arise where the teacher’s conduct or opinions might be
seen as undermining the religious ethos of the school, but would not be construed as harmful by
wider society, e.g. support for Humanists UK 57 or Stonewall.58 Considering McNab and Crizzle
together, it is reasonable to infer two things. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that ideological status will, in
and of itself, be sufficient reason to subject a non-reserved teacher to any disadvantage. However,
if the school needed a member of teaching staff to model religious practice or provide preparation
for religious rites of passage, and this was part and parcel of their role within the school, as was the
case in Crizzle, then their employing faith school may well be able to demonstrate a genuine
occupational requirement.

56

Eweida (n 51).
Humanists UK https://humanism.org.uk/
58 Stonewall https://www.stonewall.org.uk/
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Conflicts involving religious teachers whose views or conduct do not accord with the ethos of the
faith school in which they work

In many respects, the position is isomorphic for that of religious teachers working in faith schools,
where they find themselves out of step with the prevailing doctrinal culture. The courts will be
resistant to any expansion of the parameters within which differential treatment can be accorded,
the borders of statutory exemptions to equality law will not be pushed back, and where a genuine
occupational requirement is necessary, it will not be inferred in the absence of objective evidence.
Nevertheless, once again, if there is some evidence of a genuine occupational requirement being in
place, individuals will struggle to argue that their religious freedom should trump that of the wider
faith group.

In relation to the judicial maintenance of the parameters set by statute, O’ Neill v Governors of St
Thomas More School is a good illustrative example.59 In this case, a religious education teacher was
dismissed after becoming pregnant by a priest. She brought an action pursuant to the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, the applicable law at the time, and the school attempted to apply the
defence contained in section 19 of the statute.60 The response was given short shrift by the court,
taking into account that s19 was implemented in order to protect the freedom of organised religious
groups to restrict certain roles of members of a particular gender, and there was no suggestion that
the job of teaching religious education in this school was confined to female applicants. As Rivers
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O’Neill v Governors of St Thomas More School [1997] ICR 33,43F].
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s 19 - (1) Nothing in this Part applies to employment for purposes of an
organised religion where the employment is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion
or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its followers. (2) Nothing in section 13
applies to an authorisation or qualification (as defined in that section) for purposes of an organised religion
where the authorisation or qualification is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion
or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its followers.
60

correctly observed, the provision did not cover all forms of sex discrimination aimed at preserving a
religious ethos, but only the very specific type outlined.61

Equally, a useful analogy can be drawn from R v Governing Body of JFS.62 Here a pupil was denied
admission to a school on the basis that he was not deemed Jewish according to the criteria being
applied, as the conversion process which his mother underwent was not recognised by Orthodox
Judaism, and he could not, therefore, claim membership of the religious community by virtue of
Jewish matrilineal descent. The majority of the Supreme Court were of the view that the decision
made by the school authorities amounted to direct discrimination on racial grounds, and as a result
no relevant statutory exempt could be claimed. It is difficult to imagine that the court would have
adopted a different approach to racial discrimination, had the case involved an applicant for a
teaching position, rather than a pupil.

Similarly, where the court is considering a genuine occupation requirement, a robust approach will
be taken in assessing the genuine part of the formula. De Groen63 provides a recent example of this.
In this case, a private Ultra-Orthodox nursery employed a teacher, and terminated her employment
when it became known that she was cohabiting with her boyfriend. She continued to identify as
Jewish, but held a different doctrinal understanding to that of her employer about the requirements
of Jewish law concerning sexual relationships. She succeeded in establishing that she had been
directly discriminated against on grounds of both sex and religion and/or beliefs, as well as also
being indirectly discriminated against on grounds of religion and/or beliefs. It was found that a
person who shared the Ultra-Orthodox belief that cohabitation outside of marriage was wrong
would not have been subjected to the same detriment, and also that a male teacher in her position
would not have been subjected to harassment and personal questions about the risk of pregnancy
outside of marriage. Furthermore, a substantial pool of other people sharing the claimant’s beliefs
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on cohabitation and Judaism would also have been disadvantaged, allowing her to demonstrate
indirect discrimination.64

As far as this sort of discrimination is concerned, the tribunal considered the justification and found
that in order to rely upon this as a defence, an employer would have to show: 1) that it had an ethos
based on religion or belief; 2) it had applied a genuine occupational requirement; and 3) having
regard to that ethos and to the nature of the claimant’s work, the requirement was both legitimate
and justified.

The court stressed that “life-styles and personal beliefs are almost always excluded from the scope of
an occupational requirement…The greater the interference with the claimant’s human rights, the
more stringent the test should be”.65

The defendants were unable to show that there was any genuine occupational requirement for a
nursery teacher to have a domestic situation which accorded with Ultra-Orthodox norms. Whilst it
might have been a cause for gossip amongst the adult community, living with her boyfriend in no
way interfered with the claimant’s capacity to provide appropriate instruction for the children in her
care, nor otherwise had a negative impact on her behaviour and performance during working hours.
In short, her living arrangements were irrelevant, and consequently could not be construed as a
genuine occupational requirement.

As a result, it is undoubtedly the case that individual teachers are protected up to a certain point.
Courts will not expand upon the concessions granted to faith groups in respect of equality law, and
where an employer school is seeking to rely on a genuine occupational requirement, they must be in
a position to demonstrate an objective need for the demand or restriction being imposed. However,
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if such an objective need can be identified, as was the case in Crizzle, it is highly likely that the school
will be acting lawfully in imposing the requirement in question.

At one level, this is part and parcel of accommodating schools with a religious ethos within the legal
framework. In pragmatic terms, it is challenging to see how educational institutions could be
expected to maintain a religious character, if they were not permitted to ask their teaching staff to
meet genuine needs in order to achieve this objective, and this position is, arguably, in harmony
with the Strasburg case law on the protection of collective religious freedom. For instance, in
Fernández Martinez v Spain66 a religious education teacher’s contract was not renewed, after he
very publicly campaigned against the policy of the Roman Catholic Church in a number of areas,
particularly clerical celibacy. He tried unsuccessfully to challenge this through the Spanish courts,
and eventually took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing a violation of Articles 8,
9, 10 and 14. He lost before both the Chamber and Grand Chamber, and the latter in particular
stressed the importance of protecting the religious freedom of faith groups:

“It is therefore not the task of the national authorities to act as the arbiter between religious
communities and the various dissident factions that exist or may emerge within them”.67

It is important to emphasize that religious groups cannot function without the ability to live out their
faith as a community, as well as arbitrating on their own matters of internal dogma and discipline,
and this collective dynamic of religious liberty is likely to breakdown if state authorities intervene in
doctrinal disputes. However, as we shall discuss further below, the position can be complicated
where teaching staff are concerned, by virtue of the nature of their role.

Once a genuine

occupational requirement is established, individuals will have little possibility of asserting that their
personal interests over and against the collective need for religious freedom, but the very nature of
school life makes defining the scope of genuine occupational interests challenging.
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One powerful consideration in this regard is the frequently blurred relationship between working
and non-working time and activities. This has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in relation
to the significance of ‘non-directed time’ for the purposes of teachers’ employment contracts, and in
twenty-first century Britain, teachers’ working hours are not regulated nor confined to time in the
classroom.68

In addition, they are expected to act as role models for pupils and professionally

required to maintain standards of behaviour outside school as well as within it. 69 It is true that in
the De Groen case the employer failed to show a genuine occupational requirement in relation to
the teacher’s personal circumstances, but this should certainly not be taken as an indication that
conduct outside of school will be irrelevant for genuine occupational requirements where they do
arise.

There is great potential for personal and professional time and considerations to become enmeshed
where teachers are concerned, as we shall see again in turning to our third context.

Conflicts involving religious teachers in non-faith schools.

The provision which protects the religious and ideological liberties of teachers in maintained schools
without a religious character is set out in s59 of Schools Standards and Frameworks Act:

“No person shall be disqualified by reason of his religious opinions, or of his attending or omitting to
attend religious worship-

a) From being a teacher at the school, or

68

Hartley and Others v King Edward VI College [2017] UKSC 39, 4 All ER 637.
Department for Education, Teachers Standards (June 2011; Updated June 2013) 14: “Teachers uphold public
trust in the profession and maintain high standards of ethics and behaviour, within and outside school”.
69

b) From being employed [or engaged] for the purposes of the school otherwise than as a
teacher.70

Teachers are also protected from being required to teach religious education, and from being
subject to detriment for refusing to teach it,71 or on the basis of their religious opinions, attendance
or non-attendance at religious worship.72

At first sight, these provisions appear to safeguard

individuals from disadvantageous treatment on the grounds of their religious identity, or willingness
to participate in worship (which as discussed above is still a statutory requirement in state
maintained schools). Nevertheless, once we move beyond the areas specifically set out in statute as
protected, we are once again faced with a position where individuals are exposed when it comes to
expressing their beliefs, as opposed to passively and privately holding them.

A recent high profile controversy illustrates this point well. A dispute from an Oxford school, which is
currently pending before an Employment Tribunal,73 began when Joshua Sutcliffe was teaching
Mathematics to a secondary school class, ‘misgendered’ a pupil and was suspended whilst an
investigation took place. After having been accused of referring to a female to male transgender
student as a girl, Sutcliffe acknowledged having done it, but protested that it was simply a slip of the
tongue. Were this simply an innocent and isolated error, the response of the school authorities
would have self-evidently been grossly disproportionate, but the pupil’s family complained that this
misgendering was part of a wider pattern of behaviour by Sutcliffe.

It must be acknowledged that Sutcliffe was a Christian pastor for a theologically conservative
Church, and believed as a matter of faith that gender is determined by God and in harmony with
biological sex. In fact, he had gone as far as to give an interview on national television in which he

70

School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s 59(2).
ibid, s 59(3).
72 ibid, s 59(4).
73 ‘Oxford Teacher investigated for misgendering to sue school’ BBC News (11 December 2017)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-oxfordshire-42312342> accessed 25 February 2018.
71

was very open about his ideological objection to using male pronouns to refer to the student.74 In
this public appearance, he maintained that his policy was to use the pupil’s first name, or the gender
neutral ‘they’ when referring to him, thereby avoiding compromising his own beliefs, but
demonstrating respect for the pupil. To put it differently, whilst the use of the term ‘girls’ was
inadvertent, he had consistently refused to apply male pronouns to the pupil.

It is key to highlight that issues of gender identity are at the centre of current legal and social debate,
and that a spectrum of views may be found both within and without faith communities. 75
Nevertheless, it is also fair to recognize that many citizens, transsexual or not, would find it
uncomfortable if a third party in a position of power refused to use the pronoun which they believed
applied to their gender, when this was not their general habit. The very fact that Sutcliffe praised
the ‘girls’ demonstrates that he ordinarily used gendered language in referring to the people around
him (as most speaking English people, of course, do). Consequently, the teacher was treating this
pupil differently from others on the basis of their transgender status, and this had been motivated
by his religious convictions. Furthermore, his profile in the local community as a pastor in a
conservative Church must inevitably have influenced the way in which the pupil experienced this
situation, particularly bearing in mind that in light of his public religious stance, there was no scintilla
of doubt about the motivation for the different approach to gendered language between
transgendered students and others (i.e. to avoid it in the former case but not the latter).

As a result he denied this pupil’s gender identity, and such an approach was inevitably going to
prove problematic in any maintained school, given that that the Public Sector Equality Duty applies
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in this context, regardless of whether the institution a religious ethos.76 The school as an institution
had a duty to address discrimination and promote equality with regard to protected characteristics,
which include gender identity, and Sutcliffe’s religious expression as far as his differential treatment
of the pupil in question is concerned, was undermining, rather than promoting, this institutional
objective.

In the same way that courts have not been willing to allow the collective protection of religious
freedom to expand beyond its statutory boundaries, as O’Neill and JFS demonstrate, it is highly
unlikely that s59 of the School Standards and Framework Act would be allowed to operate in a way
which went beyond protecting an individual from discrimination on the basis of holding religious
beliefs, attending or not attending worship, and extended into enabling teachers to actively express
views which would undermine the school’s statutory duties or cause harm to third parties.

This is borne out by a recent decision of the Employment Tribunal, Powell v Marr Corporation, in
which a teacher who engaged in an argument about the moral acceptability of homosexuality with
her pupils, in which she shared her belief about its sinful nature, failed to establish a claim for
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief when disciplinary action was taken against her by
her employer.77 The tribunal highlighted, in relation to the human rights dimension to the case, that
the freedom to manifest a belief is not absolute, and may be limited for good reason. 78 None of this
is surprising or remarkable, but it emphasises that where a religious belief is being manifested in a
way which conflicts with a school’s proper and legitimate goals, neither the School Standards and
Frameworks Act, nor equality law more broadly, will avail individual teachers. As was the case in
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relation to faith schools, this position is justifiable on the basis of the need to weigh personal rights
against collective ones, albeit in a slightly different context here. , This observation is fundamental to
the central theme of our article, namely the appropriate response of the legal system when faced
with conflicts between individual and collective interests in this setting.

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE INTERESTS: APPROPRIATE RESPONSE?

How does this recurring theme of individual versus collective interests relate to the operation of the
legal framework? On the one hand, statutory law has set firm parameters in regard to the rights
which individuals have in respect to equal treatment, and the specific ways in which Parliament has
provided for these to be limited in relation to faith schools. Therefore, in this instance, teachers are
shielded against direct discrimination, except in so far as the democratically elected legislature has
chosen to allow it, in the interests of collective religious freedom in the education of children.

In addition, courts have been vigilant in guarding against what we would term ‘manipulative
discrimination’. In other words, situations in which schools try to impose a condition which is
directly or indirectly discriminatory in nature, but is not aimed at furthering any genuine
requirement of the institution beyond controlling or manipulating the religious/ideological profile of
the staff team. Under these circumstances, the ‘genuine’ element of the genuine occupational
requirement will be carefully assessed by the courts.

However, once this threshold is crossed and a genuine occupational requirement is identified,
individual interests give way to collective ones, and this can be challenging in the context of
teaching, because the boundaries of ‘occupational’ activity are frequently porous. Having said

which, we are not suggesting that the complexity of blurred lines between professional and private
time is an issue which is completely unique to the teaching world, and a contemporary decision from
the context of social work provides some interesting parallels. In R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield,79
the applicant had his studies terminated following a dispute over some remarks posted in an online
debate about homosexuality. The concerns which led the university and the relevant professional
regulatory body to conclude that Mr Ngole could never become a competent member of the social
work profession did not stem from the initial remarks, but his unwillingness and/or inability to
appreciate the impact of the same on third parties.

From the applicant’s point of view, he was manifesting his religious beliefs in his private time, he saw
this as his human right, and recognised no inconsistency with his future role as a social worker. He
maintained that he had not, and would not behave, in a discriminatory way towards anyone, and
could in that sense compartmentalise his faith and his professional duties. Ngole further argued that
because his views would never have a practical impact upon the way he interacted with colleagues
and service users, they should be treated as a purely private matter.

In contrast, the respondent put forward a case that by very publicly expressing views condemning
homosexuality the applicant was conducting himself in a way which would cause serious harm, were
it to continue post-qualification. There was no dispute that the applicant was identifiable from the
posts which he had left on a public internet forum, as this was how the university had initially
become aware of the issue, and this raised two major concerns. Firstly, how service users might
perceive their social worker if he expressed such sentiments, and secondly, how it might lead the
social work profession and local authority to be perceived by the wider public.

79

R (Ngole) v The University of Sheffield [2017] EWHC 2669, ELR 87.

Not surprisingly, the Employment Tribunal found in favour of the respondent. Crucially, she was at
pains to stress that there was no inconsistency between social work and conservative religious
views:

‘There are no doubt plenty of excellent social workers with views as strongly and sincerely held as this
student’s-quite possibly the same or similar views’.80

The problem was that Mr Ngole was manifesting those views in a way which was likely to have an
adverse impact on both specific service users, and more generally, would damage the trust in Social
Services. In this setting, the strength of public authorities’ case was evident, and it is easy to
appreciate why, for example, it would be difficult for a same-sex couple to feel confident in a social
worker assessing their suitability to be adoptive parents, if he is openly condemning relationships
like theirs on the internet. Moreover, pointing to probable and tangible harm from behaviours
which the applicant saw no reason to reflect upon or amend was not difficult at all.

The tribunal also made some very pertinent comments about professional standards generally,
which clearly have relevance to teachers:

‘Professional discipline, rightly, sits relatively lightly on its members outside the workplace, but it is
never entirely absent where conduct in public is concerned. There, it always requires attention to the
perceptions of others, especially those most directly interested in the performance of professional
functions’.81

Bearing this decision in mind, we wonder how a similar case might play out in an educational context
in the future. Ngole serves as a useful reminder that the religious and ideological freedom of
80
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teachers is not just circumscribed by the demands of a given employer, and they are also subject to
the disciplinary procedures of their professional regulatory body, the National College for Teaching
and Leadership. In fact, this applies to teachers in both maintained and independent schools. 82

Teachers are required to comply with the Teachers’ Standards, published by the Department of
Education,83 and a number of elements of the Standards are of particular relevance here. There is
indeed an express requirement to ‘make a positive contribution to the wider life and ethos of the
school’,84 and this would appear to suggest that, as might be anticipated, there is an expectation
that contractual and professional requirements will work in tandem, whilst both demand that
individuals promote and support the ‘ethos’ of the school, religious or otherwise.

Clearly, making a ‘positive contribution’ does not equate to subscribing to all aspects of any
particular ethos. In practical terms, there is no need for a non-reserved teacher in a school with a
Roman Catholic religious ethos to believe in the Roman Catholic doctrine or live in accordance with
its tenets, but there is a requirement not to behave in a way which actively undermines it. How
would this relate, for example, to individuals who wished to take part in a protest about a Papal visit,
if this were to be done outside of school time, but nonetheless in an open way which would become
known to the school community?85
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It is, at least arguable, that this would be a breach of the Standards for teachers in such a situation.
In addition, the Standards also deal with Personal and Professional Conduct, demanding that
teachers respect the rights and dignity of others, Fundamental British Values and those who hold
different beliefs from themselves. 86 These Standards are themselves a limit upon the personal
freedoms of teachers, and also bolster contractual limits which employers might impose. It would be
difficult, therefore, for an individual to argue that requirements which merely mirrored
governmental professional standards were inappropriate or excessive.

Of course, it should be stressed again that in this particular issue teachers are in no different a
position from other professionals, such as doctors, 87 solicitors,88 and as we have seen from Ngole,
social workers.89 Part and parcel of pursuing a professional vocation is to accept professional
responsibilities which cannot be shed at the end of the working day, and conveniently put on again
like a smart jacket when next on duty. These restrictions are there to protect those who rely upon
professionals and are in a disempowered position, as well as preventing fellow professionals from
collective damage caused by unethical behaviour.

Having said which, despite this general rule which is applicable to all professions, teachers are in a
different position vis a vis religion and belief, and the requirement to respect the ‘ethos’ of the
school is a qualitatively different professional obligation from that imposed in other contexts. There
is a duty for religious teachers to respect the school of ethos of diversity and equality, even if this
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runs counter to their faith based beliefs on gender and sexuality, and there is a contractual
obligation placed upon teachers working in schools with a defined religious ethos to respect that
culture, even if they reject it in whole or part.

Consider, for instance, the contrast between the position of teachers and the outcome of Smith v
Trafford Housing.90 This case concerned a manager in a housing trust, who sued for breach of
contract when he was demoted for having posted some moderate opinions opposing same sex
marriage in church on his private Facebook page. The court upheld his claim, ruling that his
statements were not disrespectful or liable to bring his employer into disrepute, and that they
provided no basis for taking disciplinary action. Nevertheless, read alongside Ngole, and taking into
account the dispute in Sutcliffe, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider whether the outcome
might have been different, had Smith been a teacher in a school. The impact upon pupils, especially
if they or close family members were gay, might have been profoundly negative. How would seeing
a teacher and role model whom they perhaps liked and respected expressing these views alter their
perception of him and the school?

All things considered, it is very possible that had Smith been a teacher, the court might well have
reached a different conclusion, but the same might also be suggested had he been a social worker.
It is worth noting that generally speaking in contexts like social work, the parameters within which
individuals will have to work will be broadly similar, regardless of where in the public sector they are
employed, or in other words, they will have to be aware of universally mandated professional
standards and the public sector equality duty.

Moreover, in regard to teachers there is also a need to take into account the ethos and aims of the
particular institution in which they work, especially if it is a faith school. For instance, a teacher
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posting on social media criticising the beliefs or policy of a named faith organisation on a particular
matter might not be behaving in a problematic way as far as school without a religious ethos was
concerned, but could conceivably have done enough to trigger a disciplinary sanction in a faith
school, closely allied with the organisation in question. Therefore, the line between acceptable and
unacceptable professional behaviour is context specific for teachers in England, at least where
expression of religion and belief is involved.

CONCLUSION

So where does all this discussion take us? We have established that in some respects teachers are in
a similar position to other workers with professional responsibilities to a disempowered group with
whom they deal, as well as society as a whole, and that these may justify the imposition of certain
restrictions upon personal autonomy. Yet we have also discovered that there are aspects of the
teaching context which are unique, particularly in light of the complex tapestry of legal provisions
relating to faith and education. A number of important threads can be drawn out:

Firstly, there is broad and justified consensus that the blanket freedom to directly discriminate
conferred upon some faith schools in relation to teaching staff is problematic from an equality and
human rights perspective. It would be preferable to require all faith schools to show a genuine
occupational requirement when imposing demands or restrictions on staff relating to religion and
belief. This would preserve their collective religious freedom, but would also limit discriminatory
activity to the scope of what was necessary to achieve legitimate objectives.

Secondly, where a genuine occupational requirement is found to apply, it is appropriate for
individual religious freedoms to be restricted in order to protect the collective institutional needs of
the school, whether these are focused on maintaining its religious character, or in pursuing a
broader agenda, such as complying with the Public Sector Equality Duty. Faith schools and non-faith
schools alike may have good objective reasons to restrict expressions of belief, although owning a
belief or identity should, in and of itself, never be sufficient reason to disadvantage an individual
teacher.

Thirdly, it must be acknowledged, however, that the extent to which expressions of beliefs can and
should be restricted is effectively context specific in relation to teachers in England. Different
schools will lawfully and appropriately draw the line in different places, as they will have distinct
genuine occupational requirements. This situation is the price for the collective ideological freedom
accorded to religious communities in respect of faith schools, but is potentially challenging for
individual teachers, especially in light of the often blurred boundaries between professional and
private time and activities.

In many situations, schools could do more to avoid conflict by being proactive in setting
expectations of employees, and simply stating that individual interests must sometimes give way is
not sufficient to avoid destructive clashes arising. In cases like Powell, where there is a problematic
manifestation of belief within working hours, the position is very clear cut, but it is more complex in
settings like the Sutcliffe dispute, where activities in the teacher’s private life were part of the
context of discrimination.

In contrast to our previous conclusions, which have been quite context specific, this is a lesson which
can be generalised to clashes around faith, belief and education in other jurisdictions.91 Disputes
between individual teachers manifesting beliefs and lifestyle choices which clash with the ethos of
their employment context are a constant source of litigation, and familiar themes frequently
reprised. This is precisely why it was instructive to consider Fernández Martinez v Spain above.
Regardless of the legislative, or even cultural framework, within which a relationship between a
teacher and a school is embedded, the very nature of that nexus opens up scope for mutual
misunderstandings about obligations.

Teachers are necessarily role models, and parents and employers alike understand that their
influence over pupils is more complex and profound than simply conveying academic information.
The inevitable potential for teaching staff to shape the attitudes, habits and perceptions of students
is such that their behaviour will always be the subject of scrutiny, and there will be legitimate
disagreements about where to draw the lines with regard to practical requirements, due to their
subjective nature. If there has not been an effective, open and respectful dialogue on both sides
about boundaries and expectations, then there will be potential for differing ideas of acceptable
conduct by employees, or reasonable requirements from employers, to lead to tensions.

Relationships between teachers and schools are, despite the intervention of statutes in a number of
respects, still regulated by contract law in many jurisdictions. Of course, it goes without saying that
within much of Europe, negotiation will happen within the shadow of the norms imposed by the
ECHR and EU law. However, as the cases which we have examined in the English paradigm show us,
these overarching guarantees leave many grey aspects about the extent of protection in certain
areas, and it is not always clear in the abstract where the balance between individual and collective
freedoms will be struck. Furthermore, the purpose of these instruments is not to remove all room
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for manoeuvre when it comes to negotiating employment terms, and there necessarily remains
scope for employers to seek employees able and willing to meet their specific, even idiosyncratic,
needs. Were this not the case, the instruments themselves would stifle human rights and constrain
the operation of the labour market. Consequently, the place and importance of contractual
agreements should not be underestimated.

As is the case with all contractual relationships, it is crucial that the terms are clearly understood by
both sides and articulated at the outset. This is especially true in a situation where complex and
subjective demands are made by each party, and these often touch upon matters which go to the
heart of personal matters such as belief and identity. In this sense, tensions between schools and
teachers over religion can best be managed by schools and teachers, albeit within the parameters
and safeguards laid out by human rights and equality law.

